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not the insured is living when the change is recorded." The
court distinguished the Giuffria case28 on the basis of the policy
language and held effective a change of beneficiary request
received at the home office prior to the death of the insured
but recorded a day thereafter. Since the recordation was a purely
ministerial act and the wish of the insured had been clearly and
formally expressed, the holding seems not in conflict with the
established rule.
In an opinion which contains a scholarly weighing of the
jurisprudence covering the application of R.S. 22:619B, the
First Circuit held that a finding of an intent to deceive is necessary to support the insurer's defense based on an alleged material misrepresentation in an application for a policy of life
29
insurance.
The Supreme Court will resolve the issue that has divided
some lower appellate courts concerning the nature of an action
by an insured against his uninsured motorist insurer and the
applicable prescriptive period. Writs of certiorari have been
granted in Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. ° and Thomas v.
Employers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.31 Certiorari has likewise been
granted in Verneco, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York,32
which deals with the application of a fidelity bond provision
excluding coverage under stated circumstances, and Mullin v.
Skains,3 which held that a release given by an insured to his uninsured motorist insurer did not prejudice the joint tortfeasors.

PUBLIC LAW
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Michael R. Klein*
The occurrence of elections during the symposium period resulted in a number of noteworthy decisions clarifying the election laws. Lasseigne v. Martin' presented the First Circuit with
28. Giuffria v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 La. 837, 178 So. 368 (1937).
29. Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 205 So.2d 485 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1967). For earlier discussions of the problem see The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Insurance,18 LA. L. REv. 73 (1957). The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Circuits for the 1963-1964 Term-Insurance,
25 LA. L. REv. 386 (1965).
30. 207 So.2d 925 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
31. 208 So.2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
32. 207 So.2d 828 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
33. 205 So.2d 207 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 202 So.2d 250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).

1969]

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1967-1968

261

problems relating to the state's primary election laws. 2 At issue
were procedural and substantive issues flowing from the action
of the Democratic State Committee in adding to the applicable
statutorily imposed qualifying fees,3 a fee which it believed justified by the implications of Section 18 :314(3) of the Revised
Statutes which imposes upon candidates the burden of bearing
such primary election cost as are not borne by the state or local
governments. The court rejected the contention of the committee
as frustrative of the interest of the election law, and thereupon
subjected the committee 4 to mandamus in order to render a decree which would grant the plaintiff relief. The use of the mandatory injunction was predicated on the committee's unlawful
and arbitrary refusal to perform an act which it had the sole
power to perform. In so acting, the court placed in question prior
jurisprudence in the so-called political question area. 5 In two
other election cases 6 the Fourth Circuit took a liberal view of the
residency requirement, and of the evidence disputing whether
it had been satisfied in rejecting challenges to the state's first
modern day Negro state legislator and to a congressional candidate. Under both rulings, a dual residence circumstance was approved as sufficient residence. A fourth election decision' pointed
out the hazards of using the mails, even registered mails, to satisfy the statutory requirements of filing for candidacy. Still another opinion, Angelle v. Angelle, 8 is noteworthy for its extended
responses to a number of challenges to ballots cast in the primary election, primarily concerning the markings placed on such
ballots and the treatment of them during the period of tabulation. The outcome of that decision led to a runoff, but, in Raborn
v. Secretary of State,' the court permitted the withdrawal of a
candidate who had reached the runoff to virtually elect the candidate with the highest number of votes remaining in the race.
The result thus gives withdrawal the same effect given to death
2. LA. R.S. 18:381 (1950).
3. The qualifying fees are $100 under LA. R.S. 18:310(A) and $110 under id.
18:311 (E).
4. As well as the Secretary of State.
5. State v. Democratic State Central Comm'n, 229 La. 556, 86 So.2d 192
(1956); Reid v. Brunot, 153 La. 490, 96 So. 43 (1923); Caswell v. Hoft, 119
So.2d 864 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960).
6. Daley v. Morial, 205 So.2d 213 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) ; Stavis v. Engler,
202 So.2d 672 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
7. Jordan v. 26th Senatorial Dist. Democratic Exec. Comm'n, 202 So.2d 681
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
8. 204 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
9. 204 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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of a remaining candidate.10 Moreover, the simple promulgation
of primary election results was considered sufficient to constitute a "selection" as nominees, of the two candidates receiving
the highest number of votes for the two positions open in the
election."
Beyond these election cases, a virtual potpourri of legal issues reached appellate conclusion during this symposium period.
A large number of decisions further developed the jurisprudence
of civil service. Four cases dealt with the standards for dismissal
of employees. Approved grounds included: theft from place of
employment; 1 negotiation with a prisoner by a prison employee ;13 and activity disrupting the capacity or willingness of
fellow employees to perform, despite an "excellent" rating by
the involved employee. 4 The other dismissal decision held moot
a suit contesting a substandard service rating where dismissal
for identical grounds later became finalized." A final noteworthy decision in the civil service area concerned the enforcement of the commission's duty to notify any employee of his
suspension prior to or on the date of suspension. 16 Where the
duty was not observed, the court treated the suspension inoperative and awarded the employee back pay.
Electric cooperatives were held outside the jurisdiction of
the Public Service Commission during the period of the symposium. 7 And where an electric company had an obligation to provide service to an area, the city council rather than the courts
was held to be the proper forum in which to determine the issues
relating to allocating the costs of construction. 8
State licensing statutes 0 preclude contractors from engaging in that business without having previously qualified as a
10. Vining v. Democratic Exec. Comm'n, 204 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1967).
11. Cloud v. Democratic Exec. Comm'n, 206 So. 2d 160 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1968).
12. Johnson v. State Parks & Recreation Comm'n, 198 So.2d 180 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1967).
13. Speegle v. State Dept. of Institutions, 198 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967).
14. Parrino v. LSU School of Medicine, 207 So. 2d 800 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1968).
15. Danna v. Comm'r of Ins., 207 So. 2d 377 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1968).
16. Louviere v. Ponchartrain Levee Dist., 199 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967).
17. Central La. Elec. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 251 La. 532, 205
So. 2d 389 (1967).
18. Aurora Properties, Inc. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 251 La. 880, 207
So. 2d 356 (1968).
19. LA. R.S. 37:2151-2163 (1950).
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contractor under its provisions. 20 A contractor is defined, inter
alia, as one who "undertakes, attempts, or submits a bid to construct" a building valued in excess of $30,000.21 In Quality Con22
tractors, Inc. v. State Licensing Board for Contractors,
the
court equated negotiations of a contract with bidding under
those statutes thereby subjecting to penal sanctions a company
which entered into such negotiations and contracts prior to licensing.
A goodly number of decisions during this period dealt with
the operations of local governments. In Vinson v. Plaquemines
Parish Comm'n Council,23 the court approved the council's contribution to the support of the local school board. In doing so,
however, the court did point out that such contributions could
only extend to capital costs as distinguished from operating
costs, 24 and took pains to point out another distinction-that between contributing resources to and exercising the powers of the
school board.
25
Tracing the pertinent provisions of the Revised Statutes
and of the Code of Civil Procedure, 26 the Louisiana Supreme
Court determined that where there are mayor's courts, such
courts are generally limited to the enforcement powers of fines
27
and forfeitures and thus cannot issue injunctions.
The Third Circuit took a hard line on the formalities in annexation periods in Garland v. Town of Ville Platte.25 Here the
last day of the required ten-day waiting period prerequisite to
adoption of the ordinance2 9 fell on Sunday. The city fathers proceeded to act on the ordinance the next day, Monday. Despite a
failure on the part of the complainants to show injury or prejudice, the court held the annexing ordinance illegal applying the
rule that in cases where Sunday is the last day in a period in
excess of seven days, an extra day ought to be added in order
that citizens have the time in which to act. The case seems a
questionable concession to the human trait of procrastination.
20. LA. R.S. 37:2160 (1950).
21. LA. R.S. 37:2157 (1950).
22. 206 So.2d 738 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
23. 199 So.2d 1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
24. LA. R.S. 17:100 (1950).
25. LA. R.S. 33:441

(1950).

26. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4837.
27. City of Harahan v. Olson, 250 La. 999, 200 So.2d 874 (1967). The same
rule apparently applies to city courts and to justice of the peace courts.
28. 198 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
29. La. R.S. 33:172 (1950).
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A number of the local government decisions concerned employee relations. One of these decisions concerned an oral agreement between the City of New Orleans and its firemen. 0 Having assured itself of the existence and terms of the agreement,
the court enforced it against the city's urgings. At issue were
understandings as to hours and wages, which the court deemed
effective despite the failure of the Civil iService Commission to
make recommendations regarding hours or the city's Director
of Finance to approve the financial obligations. Estoppel of the
city was the central rationale in these matters, colored substantially by judicial indications that the city was in bad faith in
seeking to violate its agreement or to avoid it by a specious declaration that a state of emergency existed.-' In all of these respects, the decision would seem to greatly strengthen the positions of those pressing public employee organization. In Penny v.
Bowden,3 the Third Circuit was called upon to consider the
procedural and substantive rights of policemen relating to their
pension fund. The court first sustained the standing of the
plaintiffs, all retired policemen, to bring the suit and in so doing
reversed the lower court. It went on to clarify the responsibilities of the city under the pension fund statutes, characterizing
it as "a positive duty... to [annually] appropriate... the difference between the benefits paid out"8 3 and the annual income
from statutory sources. In each, said the court, the duty was
greater than the city's general duties of a discretionary nature
and could be required by mandamus to allocate such resources
before exercising its discretionary power. Having thus estalished its support for the principles urged upon it by the plaintiffs, however, the court deprived them of nearly all the relief
sought in the instant case on the grounds of laches. The failure
of the plaintiffs to protest in a "reasonably prompt" period
against the diversion of funds to other public programs precluded a decree compelling payment of the deficits prior to 1965,
the year preceding the initiation of the suit. A later decision in
the Fourth Circuit 3 4 relied upon Penny, to the extent that it extended to a pension fund trustee board standing and capacity to
30. New Orleans Fire Fighters Ass'n. v. City of New Orleans, 204 So. 2d 690
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
31. Based on a threatened employee boycott which the court saw as merely
"an aggravation of a chronic condition." Id. at 695.
32. 199 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
33. Id. at 350.
34. Board of Trustees v. City of New Orleans, 207 So. 2d 166 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1968).
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sue in order to protect the beneficiaries of the fund, and authorized mandamus as a proper remedy.
A number of principles related to zoning were announced in
Dufau v. Parish of Jefferson.3 Chief among them was the discounting of any rule which required a disgruntled landowner to
petition the Parish Council to rescind a zoning reclassification
where to do so would appear a vain and useless act, as where
the parties had previously participated unsuccessfully in the
public hearings before the council which led to the reclassification. In enumerative fashion the court listed "jurisprudential
guidelines for zoning and zoning reclassification."
"1. A homeowner has the right to rely on the rule of law
that a classification made by ordinance will not be changed
unless the change is required for the public good.
"2. The power to amend is not arbitrary. It cannot be exercised merely because certain individuals want it done or
think it ought to be done.
"3. Before a zoning board rezones property, there should
be proof either that there was some mistake in the original
zoning or that the character of the neighborhood has changed
to such an extent that reclassification ought to be made.
"4. The burden of proof of original mistake or the need
for a substantial change is upon the proponents of the
change."36
In another zoning decision,3 7 a tennis court operated for the
benefit of an adjacent apartment complex was held a "commercial" use, thus precluding its operation since the ordinance only
permitted "private" use of such courts in the single-family residential area of its location. A third case3 dealt with the quality
of parking area dedication requisite to satisfaction of a zoning
requirement of a given ratio of parking spaces per apartment
unit, the court here rejected a communication stating that there
would be compliance as a self-serving letter far short of the
requisite encumbrance.
Finally, there were several decisions dealing with tort liability. In Snell v. Stein39 the Fourth Circuit relying upon the de35. 200

So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
36. Id. at 337-38.
37. Shady Grove, Inc. v. Parish of Jefferson, 203 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1967).
38. Abbott v. Caplan, 209 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
39. 201 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

cision in Hamilton v. City of Shreveport,40 dismissed a tort claim
against the parish and its traffic engineer because it found no
legislative waiver of immunity on the part of the parish as is
necessary in order to trigger the provisions of Article 3, Section
35, of the Louisiana Constitution. In Warfield v. Fink & McDaniel Plumbing & Heating,1 however, the Fourth Circuit found
such a waiver in the statutes authorizing the New Orleans sewer
and water board to exercise the expropriating power.4 2 Relying
upon an early Supreme Court opinion, 8 the court first equated
the power to expropriate with the power to sue or be sued, and
then equated that with a waiver of the board's sovereign immunity. A similar result was reached, in line with the Hamilton"
decision, in Pierce v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,45 where a pre-existing
charter provision authorizing the parish of East Baton Rouge to
sue or be sued was retroactively read and applied as a waiver of
immunity in tort under Article 3, Section 35, of the Louisiana
Constitution. Immunity was not found waived, however, by passage of two similar but not identical resolutions of the 1964 House
and 1966 Senate of the Louisiana legislature, since the history
of those resolutions was non-supportive of any "concurrent"
characterizations.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Michael R. Klein*
Interestingly, there was little jurisprudence during this symposium period concerned with ad valorem taxes or tax sales.
Only one such opinion seems noteworthy. In Jackson v. Hanna,'
the Second Circuit made an effort to clarify judicial characterization of the periods for redemption and annulment under Article 10, section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution. Put in the light
of the developed jurisprudence, the opinion would characterize
the three year period for redemption as a peremptive right and
the six month or five year period for annulment as a prescriptive one albeit limitedly so, inasmuch as corporeal possession
alone stops the running of time. While the opinion does not alter
40. 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965).
41. 203 So.2d 827 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
42. LA. R.S. 33:4078 (1950), as amended La. Acts 1952, No. 262, § 1; La.
Acts 1956, No. 426, § 1.
43. State v. Kohnke, 109 La. 838, 33 So. 793 (1903).
44. Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965).
45. 205 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 206 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).

